来源：雪球App，作者： Frankxin，（https://xueqiu.com/4737178110/246854753）
巴菲特这个夹叙夹议的故事2014年2月28日发表在致股东信中，标题为《关于投资的一些思考》。
同年3月17日，本文以《巴菲特年度信：你能从我的不动产投资中学到什么？》为题，刊发在《财富》杂志上。关于退休金的部分当时被删掉了，这是完整版本，被删减部分在文末三段。
读完大概需要6分钟，分为七部分，以下小标题系编者加注。
1、故事一：买农场2、故事二：买商业地产3、投资基本原则4、买农场地产和买股票有什么区别5、我和查理的想法6、以前不这样，我的改变7、别依赖退休金
Some Thoughts About Investing
Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.——The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin 关于投资的一些想法
如果像做生意那样投资，就是明智的。——本杰明·格雷厄姆《聪明的投资者》
It is fitting to have a Ben quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
我懂投资归功于Ben（本杰明·格雷厄姆），所以引用他的话做开场白非常合适。我会讲下股票，然后再讲Ben。不过开始之前，我先讲讲很久之前我做过的两个小的非股票投资。尽管这两个投资没有让我的财富发生巨大变化，但这两个故事能把投资原理说清楚。故事一：买农场
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
这个故事始于内布拉斯加州。从1973到1981年，中西部的农产品价格崩盘，这是由于人们普遍认为失控的通货膨胀即将到来，小型农村银行的贷款政策也在推波助澜。随后泡沫破裂，价格下跌50%甚至更多，重创了借贷的农民和借给他们钱的银行。这次泡沫的后果，导致爱荷华和内布拉斯加银行倒闭的数量，成为1937年大萧条时期的五倍。
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
1986年，我花28万美元从联邦存款保险公司买了一个400英亩的农场，位于奥马哈以北50英里。这个价格比几年前一家破产银行以这个农场为抵押的贷款金额还要低得多。我对经营农场一无所知。但我儿子热爱农业，我从他那里学到了这个农场可以生产多少玉米和大豆，以及运营成本是多少。根据这些估算，我计算出农场在那时的正常回报率约为10%。我还认为，随着时间的推移，生产率可能会提高，同时农作物价格也会上涨。事实证明，这两个预期都对。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
我不需要什么特别的知识或智慧就能得出结论，这项投资亏不了，而且可能赚到不少钱。当然，偶尔会有坏收成，农作物价格有时不及预期。但那又怎样？也会有一些特别棒的好年景，我没有任何压力会导致我不得不卖掉这个农场。现在28年过去了，农场的收入翻了三倍，价值是我当初支付的5倍甚至更多。而我对种庄稼仍然一无所知，最近才第二次去农场。故事二：买商业地产
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
1993年，我做了另一笔小投资。Larry是所罗门公司的房东，当时我是所罗门公司的CEO，他告诉我，纽约的一处商业地产毗邻纽约大学，RTC公司正在出售这处地产。和上个故事一样，也是泡沫破灭崩盘，这次是商业地产。银行过于乐观宽松的贷款助长了愚蠢行为。RTC的成立就是为了处置这些破产银行的资产，
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
这里的分析也很简单。和前面讲过的农场情况一样，不用借贷全资收购这处地产的话，当时的出租收益率约为10%。RTC无暇管理这处地产，有几个商店闲置，如果租出去的话收入将会增加。更重要的是，最大的租户占了这个项目大约20%的空间，而支付的租金约为每英尺5美元，而其他租户的平均租金为70美元。这份廉价租约将在9年后到期，这肯定会大幅提高收益。这处地产的位置也很棒：纽约大学就在这儿。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to the property.
我和Larry还有我的朋友Fred一起买下来这个商业地产。Fred是一个经验丰富的高级投资者，他和他的家族将管理这处商业地产。随着旧租约到期，他们成功地把这部分租金收入提高为之前的三倍。现在每年的分红比我们原始投资的35%还要多。此外，我们最初的抵押贷款先后在1996年和1999年进行了两次再融资，这使得几次特别分红加起来就超过了我们当初投资总额的1.5倍。到现在我还没看过那处地产。
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
未来几十年，我买的农场和纽约大学那处地产的收入大概率会增加。虽然收益不是那么惊人，但这两项投资将是我一生中坚实而令人满意的资产，对我的儿孙也是如此。投资的基本原则
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
我讲这些故事是为了说明投资的基本原则:
■ You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
你不需要成为专家就能获得令人满意的投资回报。但你必须认识到你的局限性，并遵循行之有效的方法。保持事情简单，不要赌。当有人拉你赚快钱的时候，立马回绝。
■ Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
买资产的话，要关注未来产出效益。如果你对粗略估算未来收益感到一丝不踏实，那就放弃，别干。没人能评估每一种投资的可行性。只需要懂你在做的事情，不需要啥都懂。
■ If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
如果你转而关注目标的预期价格变化，你就是在投机。这无可厚非。但我知道我没有投机的本事，我也不相信有人能持续成功投机。有一半抛硬币赌博的人第一轮会赢；他们一直赌下去的话，没人能赢钱。某项资产最近涨了这件事，从来都不是购买它的理由。
■ With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
在我这两笔小额投资中，我只考虑这些资产会产出什么，根本不关心它们每天的价格。赛场获胜的一定是专注于比赛的运动员，而不是那些眼睛盯着记分牌的人。如果你可以享受周末不看股价的日子，试试工作日也别看。
■ Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
判断宏观经济，或听别人对宏观经济看法、市场预测啥的，纯属浪费时间。实际上这很危险，因为这些内容可能会模糊你的视野，而忽视了真正重要的事。(当我听到电视评论员滔滔不绝地谈论市场走势时，我想起了Mickey Mantle的犀利讽刺：“直到进了广播室，我才知道原来棒球运动这么简单。”) （注：Mickey Mantle是美国历史上最伟大的棒球运动员）
■ My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
我这两次投资是在1986年和1993年。在随后的1987年和1994年，经济、利率、股票市场的走势对我做这两项投资一点儿都不重要。我不记得当时的头条新闻或权威人士在说啥。无论谈论什么，内布拉斯加州的玉米会继续生长，纽约大学会有大批学生。有什么区别？
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
我这两笔小额投资和股票投资有一个主要区别。股市为你的持股提供了实时报价，但我持有的农场或纽约商业地产却从未看到过什么报价。
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
对股票投资者来说，股价大幅波动按说应该是个巨大的优势。实际上，对一部分投资者来说确实如此。毕竟，如果一个与我相邻的农场主，这家伙情绪忽高忽低，每天给我出个报价，要么买我的，要么把他的卖给我；这些价格短期波动巨大，取决于他的情绪。我怎么可能不从他古怪的行为中受益呢？如果他报价低得荒唐，而我有一些闲钱，我会买下他的农场。如果他喊的数字高得离谱，我要么卖给他，要么种我的地不理他。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
然而，股民经常被其他股民的情绪和非理性行为带动着，自己也变得不理性。因为有太多关于市场、经济、利率、股价走势的说法，一些投资者认为听取股评家的评论很重要，更糟糕是，他们认为参照股评炒股也很重要。
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
股民们买了农场或房子时可以默默的持有几十年，而股市中股价每天波动，各种评论信息传递着潜台词：“别傻坐着，干点儿啥”，股民们往往变得狂热。对这些投资者来说，容易变现这个特点，本该是无条件的好处却变成了诅咒。
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
就像一个整天忽高忽低报价的邻居不会伤害我的农场投资一样，股价崩盘或其他极端的市场波动不会伤害股票投资者。事实上，当价格远低于价值时，如果真正的投资者手里有闲钱，市场暴跌对他有利。投资时，愁云密布的熊市是你的朋友；皆大欢喜的牛市是你的敌人。
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
在2008年末金融危机的大恐慌期间，尽管一场严重的衰退显然正在酝酿之中，我也从未想过要卖掉我的农场或纽约的地产。如果我拥有一家长期前景良好的公司100%股权，我想卖掉它就是愚蠢的。既然如此，我为什么要卖掉我的股票呢？这些股票其实就是优秀企业的一小部分。诚然，这些公司中的单独某一个最终可能会令人失望，但作为一个组合整体肯定会做得很好。真的有人会相信这个世界会吞噬掉美国这些具备非凡生产力的公司，和无限的人类创造力吗？我和查理的想法
When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
查理和我认为股票是企业的一小部分，我们购买股票时的分析，和购买整个企业所做的分析非常相似。我们首先确定能否合理估计这家公司未来五年或更长时间的大致盈利情况。如果我们有这个评估能力，那么此时股票（或整个公司）这时的价格，假如和我们估算最差情况下的盈利相比是合理的，我们就会买入。然而，如果我们对这家公司未来盈利没能力估算，我们就会放弃，然后看下一家公司，这种情况经常发生。在我们一起工作的54年里，我们从未因为宏观经济或政治环境，或其他人的观点而放弃一个有吸引力的买入机会。事实上，当我们做决定时，从来不讨论这些话题。
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
关键是要认识到我们“能力圈”的边界，并待在里面。即使这样，我们也会犯一些错误，不管是买股票还是收购企业。但它们不会成为那种被牛市诱惑追高买入这种灾难性的后果。
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
当然，大多数股民并没有把对公司前景研究作为他们生活中的优先事项。如果明智的话，大多数股民应该得出结论：他们对那些具体公司的了解，还不足以预测那些公司未来的盈利能力。
I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
对这些非专业人士，我有个好消息：通常投资者不需要这种技能。随着时间的推移，美国公司作为一个整体，已经取得了惊人的成就，并将继续保持下去（尽管可以肯定会断断续续）。在20世纪，从66点上涨到11,497点，股息不断增加。21世纪将见证更多的收获，几乎可以肯定是非常可观的收获。非专业人士的目标不应是挑选赢家，他和他的“助手”（比如基金经理、理财顾问）都做不到这一点，但拥有一个跨行业的公司组合一定会表现良好——一只低成本的基金将实现这一目标。
That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better longterm results than the knowledgeable who is blind to even a single weakness.
对于非专业投资者来说，这就解决了“买什么”的问题。“什么时候买”也很重要。主要的危险是，胆小的或初学的投资者会在极度繁荣的时候进入市场，然后在账面损失发生时大失所望。(记得已故的巴顿·比格斯说过：“牛市就像性爱，在结束前感觉最好。”对于投资者来说，解决错误择时的办法是：长期买入，不断积攒份额，当消息不好、股票都跌得稀里哗啦的时候，千万不要卖出。遵循这些规则，那些既分散投资又保持最低成本的小白投资者几乎肯定获得满意结果。事实上，和知识渊博但对自己哪怕一个弱点都视而不见的专业投资者相比，对自己缺点诚实的普通投资者能够获得更好的长期回报。（注：巴顿·比格斯，著名资产管理人，《对冲基金风云录》的作者，曾准确预测了20世纪90年代末的网络泡沫。）
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
如果“投资者”疯狂地相互买卖农田，他们的农作物产量和价格都不会提高。这样干的唯一后果将是拥有农场的人群总收入减少，因为当他们在咨询和买卖资产时会产生大量的成本。
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So, ignore the chatter, your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
不过，那些从提供咨询或执行交易中获利的人，会不断敦促个人和机构活跃交易。由此产生的摩擦成本可能是巨大的，而且对总体投资者来说，毫无益处。所以别理他们，保持你的成本最低，像投资农场一样投资股票。
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.
补充说明，我的钱也是这种处理方式：我在这里给出的建议与我在遗嘱中列出的做法本质相同。给我妻子的遗产是现金。（我必须用现金进行个人遗赠，因为在我去世十年里，我所有的伯克希尔股票将全部捐赠给慈善组织。）我给受托人的建议非常简单：10%的现金投资于短期政府债券，90%投资于成本非常低的基金。（建议买先锋基金公司的，收费低）我相信这个投资策略获得的长期收益，会跑赢大多数投资者（无论是养老基金、机构还是个人）聘用高收费投资管理人的收益。以前不这样，我的改变
And now back to Ben . I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
现在回头讲Ben的故事。这篇投资想法讨论的大部分内容是我从Ben的书《聪明的投资者》中学到的，1949年买Ben的书，改变了我的投资生涯。
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
在读Ben的书之前，我在投资领域迷茫徘徊，如饥似渴地阅读了所有关于投资的书籍。其中很多内容都让我着迷：我试过画图画线来预测股票走势。我坐在交易大厅，看着股价变化，听股评家的评论。所有这些都很有意思，但就是赚不到钱。
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.
相比之下，Ben用大白话阐述了他的思想（没有希腊字母或复杂的公式）。对我来说，投资要义在修订版本的第8章和第20章中。（1949年的原版章节顺序不同）这些要点今天仍然指导着我的投资决策。
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself – the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
这本书有几个趣事：修订版有个附录讲述了一个不具名的投资，这是Ben赚大钱的一个股票。本在1948年写第一版的时候买入了这个股票，这个神秘的公司就是GEICO保险。如果Ben在GEICO早期没有认识到它的与众不同，我和伯克希尔的未来可能和现在大不相同。（注：巴菲特多次投资过GEICO保险，最后伯克希尔100%拥有GEICO）
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
该书1949年版还推荐了一只铁路股票，当时售价为17美元，每股收益约为10美元。（我钦佩Ben的原因之一是，他敢使用当前的例子，而万一错了会被耻笑）在某种程度上，这种低估是由当时的会计制度造成的，规则要求铁路从其报告的收益中去掉附属公司的大量留存收益。
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF ( Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
推荐的那只股票是北太平洋公司，它最重要的附属公司是芝加哥、伯灵顿和昆西铁路公司。这些铁路现在是BNSF公司的重要部分，BNSF公司现在完全由伯克希尔所有。当年我读这本书时，北太平洋公司的市值约为4000万美元。现在，它的继承者BNSF公司（无疑已经增加了许多资产）每四天就能赚到这个数目。
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
我不记得买第一本《聪明的投资者》花了多少钱。无论成本多少，它都凸显了Ben的格言千真万确：价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。买Ben的书是我做过的最好的投资（如果不算我那两本结婚证书的话）。别依赖退休金
Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.
地方和国家的财政难题正在加剧，很大程度上是因为政府机构承诺了他们负担不起的退休金。当交养老保险的意愿和兑现退休金承诺出现两难的时候，就出现了巨大的财政困境，公众和政府官员通常低估了这个困境。不幸的是，对于大多数美国人来说，退休金难题仍然是个未解之谜。
Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine , then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.
退休金的投资策略也非常重要。1975年，我给时任华盛顿邮报公司董事长的凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆写过一份备忘录，谈到退休金机制的缺陷和投资策略的重要性。这部分内容抄录在本年报的118-136页（见文末附录链接）。
During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.
接下来的十年，你会读到很多关于公众退休金计划的消息——坏消息。希望我的备忘录有助于你理解这个问题，并及时采取补救措施。
后记感悟：1、对自己负责，不能完全依赖退休金，投资是一件必要的事。2、对自己诚实，不懂不做的话，投资的风险实际上没那么大。
附录链接：《1975年巴菲特写给凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆的备忘录》
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